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11.1  Introduction 
The purpose of  this paper is twofold. First, we examine the short-run dy- 
namic behavior of  a firm that faces both domestic and export markets. We 
focus on the adjustment process of inventories. Inventories smooth production 
processes and thereby are productive, and adjustment costs are necessary for 
the firm to accumulate or decumulate inventories. We  want to see how the 
export decision is related to the short-run dynamics of inventories. Second, by 
taking into account short-run inventory dynamics, we examine the differential 
consequences of tariffs and quotas for both exporting and importing countries. 
In a static competitive setting, tariffs and quotas exercise equivalent effects 
on both international and domestic prices and on the welfare of both importing 
and exporting countries as long as they realize the same import level. However, 
quotas are more restrictive than tariffs in the sense that the amount of import 
is completely inflexible under quotas, whereas it is still variable under tariffs. 
Therefore-in  the presence of  oligopoly in  the importing country, for ex- 
ample-oligopolistic  reactions by  import-competing firms are very different 
under tariffs and under quotas.' Even without market imperfections, we con- 
jecture that tariffs and quotas would cause critically different effects on the 
adjustment process if we explicitly consider the dynamic inventory adjustment 
of  firms. In this paper, by considering the inventory adjustment process of  a 
firm, we are able to compare the welfare effects of tariffs and quotas. 
Kazumi Asako is professor of economics at Yokohama National University Yoshiyasu Ono is 
The authors are very much indebted to John Helliwell, Takatoshi Ito, and Kazuo Nishimura for 
1.  See Itoh and Ono (1982, 1984) for the critical difference between the two trade policies in 
professor of economics, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University. 
their comments. Any errors, however, are the sole responsibility of the authors. 
an oligopolistic setting. 
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If  an import restriction is imposed, the inventory of an exporting firm will 
gradually decrease and eventually reach a new stationary state. By this process, 
an exporting firm can control not only domestic supply and employment but 
also the amount of export if a tariff is imposed. If a quota is imposed, however, 
there is no room for an exporting firm to control export. It can control only 
domestic supply and labor employment. This implies that an exporting country 
cannot help adjusting inventories faster under quotas than under tariffs. 
In fact, we show that if a tariff realizes the same stationary-state import level 
as a quota does, the import level in interim states is always higher under tariffs 
than under quotas. Since optimal tariff theory implies that a marginal tariff (or 
quota) always benefits the importing country, a marginal quota benefits the 
importing country more than a marginal tariff that realizes the same stationary- 
state import. Since world welfare does not change under a marginal trade re- 
striction, this implies directly that the exporting country prefers tariffs to quo- 
tas. This simply restates the well-known property of optimal tariffs and quotas 
that more restrictive trade policies benefit the importing country more as long 
as they are marginal. 
Recently, trade restrictions have tended to be used as a means of reducing 
trade deficits rather than as a means of providing long-term protection for an 
industry, even though trade imbalance as a whole cannot improve through trade 
restrictions on a particular industry. Then, since a tariff is less restrictive than 
an equivalent quota, in the above sense, this industry’s trade deficits should be 
higher under a tariff than under the equivalent quota (as long as the marginal 
revenue of the importing country’s demand function is positive). Therefore, if 
a tariff is imposed to reduce the present value of trade deficits in this industry 
by  the same amount as it would be reduced by  a quota, it should be more 
restrictive than  a tariff  under which  the  stationary-state import equals  the 
quota. Then, it is not clear which policy after all more improves the welfare 
level of the importing country. In this paper, we find that the importing coun- 
try’s welfare is still higher under a quota than under a tariff, even if the two 
trade policies have the same reduction effect on the present value of an ind- 
ustry’s trade deficits.* 
The rest of  the paper consists of  three sections. In section 11.2 the basic 
model of the firm is presented. We focus on two countries that are open to the 
world. There is a competitive industry whose commodity is traded between the 
two countries. The representative firm of  the industry in question produces 
output by utilizing labor and inventories of goods in process. Adjustment costs 
are needed to change inventories, so that adjustments in inventories take place 
only marginally and continuously. After analyzing the basic features of  our 
model, we consider an autonomous shock to domestic demand. We see that an 
2.  There are very few works on the welfare analysis of tariffs and quotas in a dynamic setting. 
Kimbrough (1985) and  Ono and Ikeda  (1990) are  exceptions. The  former uses a  simulation 
method, whereas the latter ignores investment in inventory and simply assumes that the output of 
firms is constant. 275  Tariffs, Quotas, and Inventory Adjustment 
initial jump in export occurs when domestic demand autonomously decreases 
because inventories and thereby output cannot adjust downward immediately. 
However, in due course, inventories start decreasing. These observations sug- 
gest that, depending on the adjustment stage of each industry, the correlation 
between inventories and exports can either be positive or negative. 
In section 11.3, we examine the differential consequences of tariffs and quo- 
tas. After analyzing both the long-run and short-run consequences of  these 
trade restrictions for the exporting country, we compare the welfare levels of 
the importing country under alternative policies. After lengthy calculations, we 
reach a proposition which, briefly put, states that the importing country prefers 
quotas to tariffs in order to reduce the trade deficit of an industry. Section 11.4 
concludes the paper with several remarks. 
11.2  The Basic Model 
We focus on two countries that are open to the world. There is a competitive 
industry whose commodity is traded only between the two countries. There- 
fore, all prices except that of this industry and the interest rate are given. Fur- 
thermore, by  assuming that the input of  numeraire goods is only labor and 
that its production technology is linear, the wage rate is also fixed in terms of 
numeraire goods. In this setting, we can apply a partial-equilibrium analysis to 
the dynamics of the industry in q~estion.~ 
11.2.1 
The representative firm of the industry in question produces output by utiliz- 
ing labor and inventories of goods in process. Inventories smooth production 
processes and thus are productive, but firms must incur adjustment costs to 
accumulate or decumulate inventorie~.~ 
Optimization by the Representative Firm 
The problem for the firm is to maximize the discounted sum of profits: 
subject to the constraint 
(2) 
where S = domestic supply, X  = exports, L = labor, Z = inventories, p  = 
domestic price, q = export price, w = wage rate, and r = given world inter- 
est rate. 
F(L,z) =  S + x  + z  + Q, (Z,z), 
3.  If each household's utility is given by U = y + &(x,),  where we take y as numeraire, then 
the demand for commodity x, depends only on its own pricep,. Therefore, by  assuming this utility 
function, we can directly apply a partial-equilibrium analysis of each industry to this general equi- 
librium model. 
4. Uzawa (1986, chap. 2) formulates a model in  which inventories enter into the production 
function. Although we follow his formulation straightforwardly here, the essential feature of the 
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The adjustment cost function and the production function are assumed ho- 
mogeneous of degree one, so that @(Z,Z) = 4 (a)Z  and F(L,Z)  =f(e)Z, where 
a = in,  and  = LLZ.  We assume the following conditions for the adjustment 
cost function: 
(3) 
and the Inada conditions for the production function: 
(4) 
+(O)  = 0, +’(O) = 0, and +(a) > 0, a+’@) > 0, +”(a) > 0, 
for any a # 0, 
AO)  =  O,f’(O)  =  OQ, andf’(e) >  O,f”(e)  < 0, for any 8 >  0. 
Defining H to be the current-value Hamiltonian 
(5)  H=pS+q[f(C)Z-S-uZ-c$(a)Zl  -weZ+OaZ, 





where @Ja) = 4(a) -  a4’(a)  and Fz(e)  =A&) -  8’’  (t).  The transversality 
condition must also follow: 
H, = 0 orp =  q, 
He =  0 or qf’(e)  =  W, 
Ha = 0 or q[1 + 4’ (a)] = 8, 
6 =  1.8 + q@‘,(a) -  qFz(l), 
lim OZe-“ = 0. 
I+- 
Condition (6) is nothing but the “law of one price,” which states that the 
same goods must  be  priced  equally  across  domestic  and foreign  markets. 
Equations (7) and (8) solve E and a, respectively, as functions of price variables 
with the following derivatives: 
(11)  c = q4),  cq = -f’  sf”  > 0, 
(12)  a = a(O,q),  a, = l/q+” > 0,  aq = -O”’+’’  < 0. 
Equation (9) describes the dynamics of the imputed price of inventory. 
11.2.2  Industry Equilibrium 
We now move from the optimization problem of the representative firm  to 
the determination of  the industry equilibrium. To begin with, we postulate that 
domestic consumption demand, other than that for inventories or lost as adjust- 
ment costs, is given by a simple demand function D(p)  with the derivative 
0,  =  D’ (p)  < 0. Similarly, the import demand of the foreign country (or the 
world as a whole) is given by M(q)  with M, =  M‘ (q)  < 0. For simplicity we 
assume that there are no import-competing firms. Then the equalities between 
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(13)  D(p)  = s, 
(14)  M(q) =  x, 
where p =  q from (6). 
Second, the firm continuously adjusts investments in inventory by looking 
at the difference between 0 and q to satisfy condition (8). Investment in inven- 
tory then alters the accumulated inventory at the next instant. 
Third, the equilibrium condition for the goods market as a whole is given by 
(15)  D(q) + M(q) + [a + 4)  (a)lZ =f(W. 
Equation (15 solves q, for exogenously given w,  as a function of Z and 0: 
(16)  q = q (Z>0>, 
with 
(19)  B = D,  + M, + (1 + +l)q  -ye$  <  0. 
Fourth, the imputed price of  inventory changes according to (9) with the 
given world interest rate. 
11.2.3 
The long-run stationary-state equilibrium is attained when Z = 0 or a = 0 
and when the imputed price of inventory remains constant over time, 6 = 0. In 
this long-run stationary state (denoted hereafter with an  asterisk), we have from 
(3) and (8) 
(20) 
and from (3), (9), and (20) 
Stationary State and Saddle-Point Path 
0* = q* 
F, (P)  =fie*) -  e*y(e*) =  I:  (21) 
Condition (21), which states the equality between the marginal productivity of 
inventory and the given world interest rate, determines P as a function of  r 
alone. Because P in turn is a function of q given by (1 l),  q*  is uniquely deter- 
mined.  The  long-run  inventory  stock  Z*,  and  thereby  aggregate  supply 
fiP)Z*, is determined by (15). 
Away  from  the  long-run  stationary  state, the  dynamics  of  the  perfect- 
foresight economy are regulated by two differential equations: 
(22) 
(23) 
z  =  J(Z,€I) =  a(0,q)Z 
e =  K(Z,0)  = re + qaz  (a(0,q))  -qFZ(t(q)). 278  Kazumi Asako and Yoshiyasu On0 
From (22), the Z = 0 locus is a downward-sloping curve on the (2,O) plane, 
because J, = -q,Z/q+"  > 0 and Je = (1 -  qe)Z/q+" > 0. Above and to the 
right of this curve Z > 0, while below and to the left of it 2 < 0. On the other 
hand, the 6 =  0 locus is either a downward-sloping curve or an upward-sloping 
curve because Ke = r -  fqe  is not definite in sign. However, we have K, = - 
fq, > 0 implying that 6 > 0 to the right of the 6 = 0 curve, while 6 < 0 to the 
left of it. 
The phase diagram of  figure 11.1 presupposes a downward-sloping 6 = 0 
curve. For this to be the case, we need to assume a sufficiently small qe. If  qe 
is large enough to approach unity, the 6 = 0 curve becomes upward-sloping. 
Nevertheless, for any 0 <  qe < 1, the long-run stationary state exhibits saddle- 
point stability, because the characteristic equation 
(24)  q2 -  (J, + K,)q + (JzKe -  JeKJ =  0 
has two roots opposite in sign, which is so because we obtain 
(25)  JLKe -  J,K, = tf  'qJlq+" <  0. 
Thus, for any historically given inventory stock, there is an optimal path, de- 
picted by arrows, pointing to the stationary state, along which inventory even- 
tually reaches the stationary state. Only when the economy is on this optimal 
saddle-point path is the transversality condition (lo)  satisfied. Note that, inso- 
far as saddle-point stability exists, the optimal path is definitely downward- 
sloping whether the slope of the 6 = 0 curve per se is positive or negative. 
11.2.4  Export-Drive Hypothesis 
When an autonomous shock occurs which shifts domestic demand down- 
ward, inventories become redundant. Then, because the imputed price of in- 
z'  Z 
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ventories jumps down, the export price also jumps down, which in turn brings 
about an initial upward jump in exports. Throughout this process, inventories 
cannot decrease immediately, since changing inventories is costly. However, in 
due course, inventories start decreasing. Then, after the initial increase in ex- 
ports, both inventories and exports start decreasing as we obtain from (14): 
since we have (17) and (1  8) and we know that 8 and 2 are inversely related 
along the optimal path. 
Exports keep decreasing to reach the former stationary-state level as the new 
export price is exactly the same as the former level. This fact is immediate, 
since we know that P,  which is a function of q*, is determined uniquely from 
(21). Thus, the dynamic effects of a decrease in domestic demand on inventory 
stock and exports are summarized without any rigorous proof as f01lows:~ 
Proposition 1:An  autonomous decrease in domestic demand causes a gradual 
reduction in inventories. Exports first increase but later decrease to the former 
stationary-state level. 
In Japan, it is usually pointed out that when the Japanese economy slows 
down more exports are driven, a presumption known as the export-drive hy- 
pothesis. This hypothesis has often been tested by checking whether the corre- 
lation between inventory stock and exports is positive. However, from the dy- 
namic  optimal  behavior  presented  above,  this  simple  relation  may  not 
necessarily hold even when export drive per se is present. In fact, from proposi- 
tion  1, we find that if  domestic demand gradually declines, exports increase 
because inventories cannot adjust instantaneously, and inventory stock stays 
too high for a while. In this process, the firm keeps reducing inventories to 
adjust them to a new stationary state. Thus, there should be a negative correla- 
tion between inventories and exports. When domestic demand stops declining, 
the firm continues to decrease inventories and to reduce exports as well. Thus, 
in the latter stage, inventories and exports will be correlated positively. Thus, 
depending on the adjustment stage of  each industry, the correlation between 
inventories and exports can either be positive or negative.6 
5. A proof of proposition 1 can be established by a phase diagram analysis. The optimal saddle- 
point path shifts to the left and downward when domestic demand autonomously decreases. This 
shift is qualitatively the same as the one initiated by  the introduction of  an import tariff or an 
import quota by the foreign country. See figure 11.2 of the next section. 
6. Asako et a]. (1993) examine the determinants of export-output ratios of Japanese manufac- 
turing industries. They  find that, whereas there are industries, such as ceramics, metal, and trans- 
portation machine manufacturing, for which the correlation between inventory stock and exports 
is positive, there are also industries, such as foods and textile manufacturing, for which the oppo- 
site of this relationship is the case. The implication of proposition 1 is totally consistent with these 
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11.2.5  Empirical Examination 
In this subsection, we conduct an empirical examination utilizing data on 
Japanese manufacturing firms. The firm’s export-output ratio is regressed on 
two  main explanatory variables: inventory-output ratio (INV) and liquidity 
asset-output ratio (LIQ). The higher the latter ratio, the smaller the expected 
export-output ratio, because a firm is confronted with less export-drive pres- 
sure by the same amount of decrease in autonomous demand. A Tobit model 
is employed each year from 1964 to 1990 because there are firms each year for 
which the export-output ratio takes the value zero. The number of firms varies 
from 869 to 986 depending on the year. All data are taken from the Nikkei 
NEEDS Company data file. 
The estimation results are summarized in table 11.1. The number of samples 
(SMPL) as well as the number of  firms with  positive export-output ratios 
(POS) are indicated in the same table. The SIGMA variable indicates the stan- 
dard error of  the regression of the Tobit model. The inventory-output ratio is 
Table 11.1  Estimation Results 
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estimated with positive sign every year at the 1 percent significance level. This 
indicates that the initial negative correlation between export and inventory 
pointed out in proposition 1 is, if it exists, not predominant in the present data 
set. Thus the larger the inventory-output ratio the higher the export-output 
ratio. 
Meanwhile the LIQ variable takes negative signs only in the early years. 
From the mid-1970s the export-output ratio is higher, the larger the liquidity 
asset-output  ratio. Since the positive correlation is significant during 1980s, 
we need a theory which explains this relationship. Although such a topic is 
interesting, it is beyond the scope of the present paper. 
11.2.6  Relative Adjustability of Inventory and Employment 
In the argument above we assumed that  employment can adjust flexibly 
whereas inventories adjust only gradually. Even if employment is not perfectly 
adjustable, proposition 1 holds as long as there is some factor of production, 
instead of employment, inputs of which can adjust flexibly. However, if there 
is no flexible factor and employment is not perfectly flexible, a firm cannot 
instantaneously adjust production. Therefore when domestic demand autono- 
mously declines, exporting firms would first accumulate inventories and in- 
crease exports. Then they would gradually reduce inventories, employment, 
and export. In this way  inventory and export may move in parallel. Thus the 
effect of  an exogenous decrease in domestic demand on the movements of 
inventory and export would differ across countries and across industries, de- 
pending on whether employment can adjust flexibly or not. 
Messmore (1992), for instance, presents empirical research on the flexibility 
of employment and inventories. She shows that flexibility of employment dif- 
fers across countries. Especially in EC countries, such as Belgium, France, 
Sweden, and Norway, obstacles to the termination of employment contracts are 
serious, whereas in the United States they are unimportant. Japan and presum- 
ably East Asian countries are in between. Proposition 1 may fit the U.S. case 
more. 
11.3  Tariffs and Quotas 
In this section, we introduce tariffs and quotas as alternative means of  re- 
stricting exports of  the home country. Namely, the foreign country imposes 
either a tariff or a quota. A quota does not give any room for exporters to adjust 
the amount of  exports even by  reducing prices. Under a tariff, on the other 
hand, exporters can affect the amount of exports by changing prices. In a static 
setting, the effects of these two alternative restrictions are the same, as long as 
the same quantity of export is guaranteed. However, in a dynamic setting, ex- 
porters will change the export amount under a tariff in the stage of adjusting 
inventories since the marginal cost will differ over time. Under a quota the 
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fore the effect of  a tariff on the welfare of  an importing country will differ 
from that of a quota. 
Note that the following arguments still hold as long as there is some factor 
of production, the accumulation of which is costly. Therefore, even if we con- 
sider, instead of inventories, real capital accumulation, which is costly, we ob- 
tain the same results. 
11.3.1  Tariffs 
We begin with an import tariff set by the foreign country. The equilibrium 
condition for the export market of  the home country is written, instead of 
(14), as 
(27) 
where T stands for an import tariff. Substituting (27) into (13, we can rewrite 
the equilibrium condition of the industry as 
x  =  Mq(1 + T)), 
(28)  Wq)  + [a + +(a)lZ =AQZ -  Mdl  + 7)). 
From (28),  in response to the marginal introduction of the tariff we have for 
7=0 
(29)  Bdq = -( 1 + +’) u,ZO + cf -  (U + +)}dZ -  qMqdT. 
Therefore, besides (17) and (1  8), we get 
We  now discuss the effects of  the marginal introduction of a tariff on the 
long-run stationary state. To  begin  with, we  see from (21) that  the labor- 
inventory ratio @ depends solely on the interest rate, implying that @ is unaf- 
fected by the tariff. Then, since the marginal productivity of labor is indepen- 
dent of the tariff, the price level q*  stays unaffected by the introduction of the 
tariff because the wage rate is kept intact in (7) or (1  1). 
When q*  and thereby the imputed price of inventory O*  are unaffected by 
the tariff, we obtain from (29) that 
Equation (31) means that the introduction of  a tariff by  the foreign country 
decreases the optimal long-run stationary-state inventory stock in the home 
country. The reduction of  inventory should decrease the output supply and 
thereby exports. Domestic supply is invariant under tariffs as the price level 
is unaffected. 
Next, we examine the short-run transitional impact of the introduction of a 
tariff. To  begin, we observe that the free-trade long-run stationary state now 283  Tariffs, Quotas, and Inventory Adjustment 
belongs to the region where both Z and 8 are increasing over time because we 




This implies th 
ai 
aT 
-  = a,qJ  > 0, 
?f! = -  fq, > 0.  aT 
t the saddle-point  paths shift to the left and downward, as il 
trated in figure 1  1.2. 
us- 
Figure 11.3 depicts the transitional paths of inventory stock Z, imputed price 
of inventory 8, export price q, domestic supply S, and exports X.  The inventory 
stock gradually decreases to the new  stationary-state level. Price variables 8 
and q show qualitatively similar variations; i.e.,  these variables jump down 
initially and then keep rising until the common old equilibrium level 8* =  q* 
is recovered. The time profile of domestic supply is just the mirror image of 
that of export price; i.e., it initially jumps up and then decreases gradually until 
the old equilibrium level is reached. Exports of the home country  jumps down 
initially and then keeps decreasing as the export price keeps rising. 
11.3.2  Quotas 
Next we consider the effect of an import quota set by  the foreign country. 
Thus we impose the quantity constraint 
(34)  x  =  x, 
so that we have, in place of (28), 
ZTW  Z' 
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0  t 
“I  O 
“t  0  t 
Fig. 11.3  Time profiles of variables under a tariff 
(35) 
The long-run impacts of quotas are qualitatively similar to those of tariffs and, 
in fact, both policies exert quantitatively the same long-run impact if only 
(36) 
holds in the long-run stationary state. 
D(q) + [a + +(a>]Z  =Ae)z -  x. 
D(q*(l + 7))  =  x, 
To  see the short-run transitional impacts, we first obtain from (35) 285  Tariffs, Quotas, and Inventory Adjustment 
(37)  (B -  Mq)  dq = -a&'*dO  +  fdZ - a, 
where derivatives and parameters are evaluated in the stationary state. Compar- 
ing (29) and (37), we  observe that the short-run dynamics of the transitional 
paths under quotas are to some extent very similar to those under tariffs, so 
that we do not depict any particular figure for this case. 
However, once we take a closer look at the short-run dynamics, we know 
that the short-run transitional export price is lower than the long-run stationary 
level when inventories decumulate. This indicates that 
(38)  M(q'( 1 f 7))  >  M(q'*  (1 + 7))  =  x, 
holds throughout the transitional path, where qT  denotes the export price under 
a tariff. Therefore, in the short run exports are greater under tariffs than under 
quotas. The opposite is the case when inventories accumulate. 
11.3.3  Tariffs versus Quotas: Alternative Ways to Reduce Trade Deficits 
In this subsection, we compare the welfare effect of a tariff with that of  a 
quota when they decrease the trade deficit of an industry by the same amount. 
Suppose that either a marginal tariff or a marginal quota is imposed in a 
competitive industry where the amount of trade is X* and price is q*. We derive 
from (7) and (21) that in a stationary state q*  is invariant even under trade 
restrictions. Therefore, we have 
(39) 
(40) 
A@(-)  = q"(-) -  q* =  0, 
AqT(m) =  qT(-) -  q* = 0, 
where q" (t)  and qT (t),  respectively, represent the export price path under the 
quota and that under the tariff. 
If  a marginal tariff T (= 0) and a marginal quota x  (= X*) have the same 
effect on the present value of trade deficit in this industry, we have 
(41) 
where using (39) and (40) A@ and AqT are given by 
[Y(X*A@ + q*A&e-"dt  = [&Y*AqT + q*  (q*h + Aq7) Mq]e-" dt, 
(42) 
(43) 
A@ (t)  = [A@ (0) -  A@ (-)]eq*'  + A@ (-)  = A@(0)eqzt, 
AqT (t)  = [Aq' (0) -  AqT  (w)]eqit + AqT (-)  = AqT(0)eqTz. 
Negative parameters -q* and qT,  respectively, are the solution of characteristic 
equation (24) under the quota and that under the tariff. Therefore, from (41) 
we obtain 
(44)  [X*(A@(O)/AX)/(r -  q") + q*/r]AX 
= [(X* + q*Mq)  (AqT(0)/AT)/(r -  q')  + (q*)2MJr]A~. 286  Kazumi Asako and Yoshiyasu Ono 
Since we naturally assume that Aq'(O)/A-% > 0 and AqT  (O)/AT < 0 and that 
the marginal revenue of the foreign demand function is positive (i.e., X*  + 
q*Mg >  O),'  (44) implies that A-%/AT < 0 when (41) is satisfied. 
Because changes in the importing country's surplus under a quota and under 
a tariff are given as 
(45) AW/U  = -  k  X*[Ag'(t)/We-"dt  = -  X*(Aq(O)/AX)/(r -  q"), 
(46)  AW/AT = -  X*[Aq'(t)/A~]e-"dt  = -  X*(AqT(0)/AT)/(r -  qT), 
we obtain from (44) that 
[X*(Aq'(O)/AX)/(r  -  q")  +q*lrl[AW/A~ -  (AW/AX)(AX/AT)]X* 
= -[X*(Aq'(O)/AX)/(r  -  q") + q*/r](AqT(0)/A~)/(r  -  q') 
+ [(X*+q*Mq)(AqT(0)/A~)/(r  -  q') 
+ (q*)2MJrl(Aq'(o)/m/(r  -  q") 
(47) 
= (q*/r){[(AqX(O)/AX)/(r -  q')l[q*  + T(AqT(0)/AT)/(r -  qT)1M9 
-  (AqT(0)/AT)/(r -  q')]}. 




sgn[AW/AT -  (AW/AX)(A%AT)]  = sgn(a), 
a = [(Aq'(O)/m/(r  -  q*)][q*  + r (AqT(0)/AT)/(r -  qT)]M9 
-  (AqT(0)/AT)/(r -  q'). 
By calculating Q we derive the following property: 
Proposition 2:As long as a quota reduces the trade deficit of an industry by the 
same amount as a tariff does, it is more advantageous for the importing country 
to impose a quota. 
Proofi See appendix. 
Thus, the importing country would prefer quotas to tariffs to reduce the trade 
deficit of an industry. 
11.4  Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we have analyzed the dynamic inventory behavior of competi- 
tive firms that face both domestic and export markets. We have been especially 
7.  This can be negative when the marginal cost of the exporting firm  is very low. Then, tariffs 
or quotas even increase trade deficits. Here, we treat the case where  trade restrictions reduce 
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interested in the dynamic interactions between inventory adjustment and ex- 
ports. The analytical results can be summarized in two theoretical proposi- 
tions. 
Proposition 1 indicates that the correlation between inventories and exports 
can either be positive or negative, depending on the adjustment stage of each 
industry. Proposition 2 compares tariffs and quotas in the presence of inventory 
adjustment. It turned out that an importing country's welfare is higher under a 
quota than under a tariff when the two trade policies have the same reduction 
effect on the present value of trade deficits. 
Our analytical framework can be utilized to analyze a variety of  problems 
left unanswered in the present paper. These include the incorporation of inter- 
temporal optimization by consumers, consideration of endogenous growth, and 
extension to a truly standard general equilibrium framework. 
Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 2 
We obtain Ag'(O)/a and Aq'  (O)/AT, and derive a.  At t = 0, we obtain from 
the market equilibrium condition under a quota x: 
(Al) 
so that 
(A2)  DY  (dg'(0))  + dX  = -{[(f')*/(q*f")]dg'  + du(O)}Z*, 
since dZ(0) = 0, Z(0) =  Z*, and +'(a(O)) =  +(O)  = 0. Deriving du from the 
first-order condition (8) as du =  (dO-dq)/(q+")  and substituting the result into 
(A2), we obtain 
(A3) 
where B*  equals expression (19) evaluated in the stationary state. Since from 
the dynamic equation of 8"(t) P(0) is written as 
644) 
~(s'(0))  + x = rnQg'(0))) -  [a(O>  + +(~(o>)Ilz(0>, 
-(B* -  M,)dg'(O)/dX = 1 + [Z*/(q*Cy)ld8~(O)/dii, 
F(0) = q*  + [K:/(q"  -  &)](Z(O)  -  Z"(W)), 
where Kx  (z, 8) represents (23) under a quota, we get 
(A5)  dF(0)ldx = -  [K;/(q" -  8)ldZ"  (=)/dX. 
In the new stationary state to be reached at t =  00, the equilibrium condition of 
the industry becomes 
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where q(-)  is invariant regardless  of trade policies  and equals q‘(0) = q*. 
This implies that we obtain 
(‘47)  dZX(=)/dX = l/f(e*). 
Therefore, we obtain from (A3), (A5), and (A7) that dq‘(O)/dx satisfies 
-(B* -  Mq)dq(0)/dX 
= 1 -  [KZ/(q” -  K;;)][Z*/(q*f+”)]  (As) 
= 1 -  {@*/[(r -  qX)(B* -  Mq)q*+”  +fl*]}, 
from which we obtain 
(A9)  -[dq(O)/dQ/(r -  q”)  =  q*+”/[(r  -  q”)(B* -  M&*+”  +fZ*l. 
We next obtain Aq‘(0)lA.r. The market equilibrium condition under a tariff 
T is written as 
(A10) 
so that we obtain 
D(q‘(0))  + M((1 + 7)q7(O)) = me(qT(o))> 
-  + +(4O))lIZ(O), 
(All)  -B*~~(o)MT  = q*M, + [z*/(q*+”)]de’(o)/d~. 
W(0) = q*  + [lq/(qT  -  G)](Z(O)  -  Zq-)), 
Since from the dynamic equation of 8’ (t)  P(0) is written as 
(A 12) 
where K  (z,  0) represents (23) under a tariff, we get 
(‘413)  de’(0)ld.r = -  [q/(qT -  Ki)]dz’(-)/dT. 
Letting t +  -,  the equilibrium condition of the industry becomes 
(A141 
where qT(-)  =  q*, so that we obtain 
6415)  dZ(=)/dT =  q*MJfP). 
Wq‘(-))  + M((1 + 4qT(m)) =Ae(qT(->))z’(->, 
Therefore, we obtain from (All), (A13), and (A15) that dq‘  (O)/d? satisfies 
(A16)  -B*dq‘(O)/dT  = q*Mq{ 1 -  [q/(qT  - re)]  [z*/(q*fv)]} 
= q*MJ 1 -  jZ*/[(r -  q‘)B*q*+”  +  jZ*]}, 
from which we obtain 
(A17)  -  [dq’(O)/d~]/(r  -  q‘) =  (q*)’M,+”/[(r -  qT)B*q*+” +  jZ*]. 289  Tariffs, Quotas, and Inventory Adjustment 
Now, applying (A9) and (A17) to (49), we derive 
(A18)  [(B* -  M,) (I -  q") +fZ*/(q*Iy)]  [B*(r -  q') 
+ jZ*/(q*+")]fl/(q*M,)=  B*qT -  (B* -  M,)qx, 
which implies that 
(A 19)  sgn(fl) = sgn[(B* -  M,)q" -  B*q']. 
But, q'  and q"  are, respectively, negative roots of  the following characteristic 
equations: 
(Am  (q')*  -  rq'  + [fz*(f-  r)/(B*q*+")I = 0, and 
('421)  (qx)2  -  rqx  + [fZ*(f-  r)]/[(B*  -  M,)q*+"]  = 0. 
Then, because we know B*  <  B* -  M, < 0 and because it is easy for us to 
derive &qTB*)/dB* <  0, by  comparing (A20) and (A21) we get (B* -  M,) qx 
<  B*q'. This implies that (A19) is negative, which in turn implies that 
(AW  A W/Ar  <  (A Wx/A%)(A%Ar). 
Inequality (A22) proves proposition 2.  Q.E.D. 
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Comment  Kazuo Nishimura 
Asako and Ono present a dynamic trade model with inventory adjustment. Two 
main results are reported in this paper. I will discuss them in order. 
The first result concerns the export-drive hypothesis, which says that a de- 
crease in domestic demand leads to inventory accumulation, which drives a 
country to export more. Asako and Ono say that there is not necessarily a 
positive correlation between inventories and exports, which is contrary to the 
export-drive hypothesis. However I do not fully agree with their interpretation 
of proposition 1. The level of inventory 2 is a state variable in the model. All 
other variables are functions of inventory. If there is exogenous shock (autono- 
mous decline in demand), the domestic demand function D(p)  shifts down- 
ward. This will change the values of the shadow price of inventory 8, goods 
prices p  = g, and the other variables a and 1 and also the amount of export 
associated with the given initial level of inventory. This is the only case when 
export increases. However inventory stays at the initial level in this case. Then, 
a decline in demand causes a change of  stationary state, and inventory and 
export start to move  toward a new  stationary state. As  inventory decreases, 
export will also decrease. Therefore, whenever inventory changes, we observe 
a positive correlation between inventory and export. In conclusion there is non- 
negative correlation between inventory and export and thus effect in the adjust- 
ment process contradicting the export-drive hypothesis. 
The second result states that a quota is more advantageous than a tariff for 
the importing country, given the condition that the trade deficits under both 
policies are the same. Trade deficit here is restricted to mean the trade deficit 
of the imported good industry. Hence it is equivalent to the total value of the 
import. And by total value Asako and Ono mean the discounted present value 
of the import. The advantage of the importing country is measured by its wel- 
fare change. Welfare is measured by consumer surplus. Because the demand 
curve for the imported good by importing country is fixed, there is no substitute 
good for the imported good. 
Since the model of this paper is formulated to explain the dynamics of the 
exporting country, proposition 2 should be a result on the welfare of the ex- 
porting country. The welfare implication for the importing country may  be 
given as a corollary or in a remark after proposition 2. The import function 
M(q)  is the only place in this model where the importing country plays a part. 
Therefore the welfare implication for the importing country given in proposi- 
tion 2 should not be counted as a main result. 
My comments above are only on the interpretation or statement of the re- 
sults. Reading through the paper, I must say that Asako and Ono derive the 
comparative dynamics in a very clever way. I think that comparative dynamics 
Kazuo Nishimura is a professor of economics at the Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto Uni- 
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are much more difficult than comparative statics in most cases. Their contribu- 
tion is certainly an important addition to the literature. 
Comment  John F.  Helliwell 
This paper provides an imaginative use of  costly inventory adjustment as a 
means of modeling differentially the effects of tariffs and quotas and of analyz- 
ing the movements of exports and inventories following an unexpected drop in 
domestic demand. The two main parts of  the paper focus on separate issues 
and depend for their results on different features of the model setup, so they 
should be considered separately. 
Inventories and Exports 
The authors’ main conclusion in this section is that the correlation between 
inventories and exports can be either positive or negative, depending on the 
stage of an industry’s response to an unexpected change in tariffs or quotas. In 
the first stage of response to an unexpected drop in domestic sales, inventories 
will be dropping gradually while exports will be rising. This, they argue, upsets 
the  commonly  held  presumption,  known  as  the  export-drive hypothesis, 
whereby a positive relation is to be expected. The fact that their model upsets 
the export-drive hypothesis depends on very  special features of  their model 
setup, and in particular on assumptions that are contrary to those that underlie 
the export-drive hypothesis. I think that their assumption may be less plausible 
than an alternative setup that would be more compatible with the export-drive 
hypothesis. To focus more clearly on the issue, I shall first outline what I take 
to be the logic of the export-drive hypothesis and then spell out how that hy- 
pothesis assumes a quite different set of assumptions about inventory and fac- 
tor adjustment costs than is employed by Asako and Ono. 
The export-drive hypothesis starts with the notion that inventories accumu- 
late in the wake of  an unexpected drop in domestic sales, and producers then 
make a drive to expand export markets in order to help eliminate their excess 
inventories. Thus periods with high inventories tend to be associated with high 
exports as well, at least in those instances where the high inventories are due 
to an unexpected drop in domestic sales. Obviously, if the sales surprise took 
the form of an unexpected increase in export demand, then high exports would 
be associated with low inventories, following the same logic about the buffer 
stock use of inventories. Hence, the correlations that are being talked about in 
John F. Helliwell is Mackenzie King Visiting Professor of Canadian Studies at Harvard Univer- 
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the export-drive hypothesis are specific to a particular shock and cannot be 
tested by simple correlations. 
By contrast, when the Asako-Ono model is confronted with unexpectedly 
low domestic demand, inventories are gradually reduced, while exports are 
increased at first, before eventually returning to the former stationary-state 
level. Both models show an increase in exports, above the path that otherwise 
would have taken place, but some of the implications for inventory stocks are 
strikingly different. In the Asako-Ono setup and in the model implicitly under- 
lying the export-drive hypothesis, long-run target inventories are reduced in 
response to any reduction in long-run expected sales. What distinguishes the 
two approaches is the nature  of  the short-run inventory adjustment. In  the 
Asako-Ono setup, inventories drop right from the outset. Inventory stocks do 
not drop immediately to the new target level, since they are subject to adjust- 
ment costs that increase with the speed of  adjustment. However, inventories 
cannot increase in response to an unexpected drop in sales since there are as- 
sumed to be no costs of adjusting other factor inputs. Hence output immedi- 
ately falls by more than the unexpected drop in sales, by an extra amount equal 
to the partial adjustment of inventories toward their new target level. 
In the model implicitly underlying the export-drive hypothesis, by contrast, 
there is room for inventories to act as an optimal buffer between unexpected 
sales changes and a stabilized production level because there are assumed to 
be costs entailed by changing the level of output and none to changing the level 
of inventories, beyond those that might flow from the fact that factor inputs, 
and hence output, are costly to adjust. 
Thus the Asako-Ono conclusion about the movement of  inventories in re- 
sponse to an unexpected drop in domestic sales differs from the export-drive 
hypothesis because of fundamentally different assumptions about adjustment 
costs. A judgment about the relative plausibility of the two results requires us 
to choose between the two conflicting sets of  assumptions about adjustment 
costs. 
Which is the more likely assumption about adjustment costs? I would be 
inclined to cast my  vote for assuming that output is costly to adjust, which 
amounts to assuming that all measured factor inputs are costly to adjust, and 
that abnormal rates of  factor utilization, while possible, are not costless. With 
these assumptions about adjustment costs, it is not necessary to assume any 
further adjustment costs in the level of inventories, and the door is opened for 
inventory stocks to play a buffering role between uncertain changes in sales 
and costly-to-adjust production levels.' Indeed, I am inclined to think that 
something of this sort probably underlies Asako and Ono's  initial argument 
that inventories are productive because they smooth production processes. This 
would in turn seem to imply that there are cost advantages to a smooth produc- 
1. Some evidence favoring such a buffer-stock role for inventories in the industrial countries is 
presented in Helliwell and Chung (1981). 293  Tariffs, Quotas, and Inventory Adjustment 
tion process, and if inventories are to play such a role, it is presumably because 
they are available to be run up or run down to help buffer unexpected changes 
in demand or cost conditions. 
Tariffs and Quotas 
On the tariffs versus quotas issue, the main point the authors emphasize is 
that costly adjustment alters the relative present values of  the costs of  using 
tariffs and quotas in favor of using quotas to achieve any given target reduction 
in the present value of trade deficits. I conjecture that this result is quite general 
and is likely to hold for a variety of specifications of costs of adjustment. This 
is likely because the result depends on the central distinction between tariffs 
and quotas, that the latter bite immediately on quantities and hence have a 
larger ratio of short-term to long-term trade balance effects in the presence of 
adjustment costs. To illustrate the generality of this result and its independence 
from the specific role of  inventories, I think it would be possible to relabel 
inventories as plant and equipment and the analysis would carry through just 
as it does now,  providing we  continue to make the assumption that capital 
goods are an undifferentiated part of the homogeneous output of the represen- 
tative firm. 
Given the practical importance of the choice between tariffs and quotas and 
the likelihood that the result does not depend on the authors’ specific assump- 
tions about the role and costliness of inventory adjustment, it would be helpful 
to provide some indication of  how  it might be possible to assess the likely 
magnitude of the partial preference of quotas over tariffs. If the likely effect is 
small, then it can safely be treated as a secondary member of the larger set of 
efficiency issues surrounding the revenue, distribution, and political conse- 
quences of the use of tariffs and quotas. In any event, fine-tuning the choice 
between tariffs and quotas, as applied by one country acting on its own, ought 
to be subservient to the larger questions of the likelihood of retaliation of oth- 
ers and  of the systemic effects of making industry-specific tariffs and quotas a 
feasible goal for firms that might better be spending their scarce entrepreneur- 
ial talents finding new products, improving production techniques, and devel- 
oping new markets. 
Although I regard the comparison of tariffs and quotas to be more convinc- 
ing than the arguments about the short-run dynamic linkages between invento- 
ries and exports, the quality of the analysis is high throughout the paper, re- 
flecting the sensible application of sharp tools to interesting issues. 
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